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Abstract: In this work I argue that John Rawls’ The Law of Peoples is vulnerable to the 
critique of becoming a modus vivendi, a point that has been given little consideration 
until now. A modus vivendi is an arrangement of coordinated self-restraint of competitive 
behavior between two or more parties in the hopes of self-interest maximization and a 
peaceful coexistence. I cite two reasons: his oversight of what I call the aggressive state, 
and the restricted operation of public reason in the Society of Peoples. I ultimately 
suggest that adopting a model of public reason widened to permit participation of 
qualified individuals external to the Society of Peoples, in conjunction with revisions to 
the grounds for just intervention in the Law of Peoples, alleviates both of these issues. 
To execute this project I begin by explaining Rawls’ conception of global justice 
and public reason as seen in The Law of Peoples. From here, I elaborate on my critique of 
instability, illustrating why Rawls’ model has the potential for becoming a modus 
vivendi. I then explain how The Law of Peoples permits aggressive states – a type of state 
not included in Rawls’ account. Next, I spell out my two-part remedy for the instability 
that is exemplified by the room left for the aggressive state: extending the permissible 
grounds for intervention from just human rights violations to also include the defense 
against unjust inequalities being imposed upon one state or peoples by another, as well as 
a more inclusive conception of public reason that permits all reasonable citizens – not 
merely representatives – to participate. I offer this particular remedy to stay in keeping 
with the Rawlsian tradition. While doing this, I consider and refute objections to both of 
my proposed components. In refuting these objections I confirm that my suggested 
modifications to the Law of Peoples should be adopted so that the threat of instability can 
be definitively eliminated from Rawls’ account of global justice. 
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The Instability of The Law of Peoples and a Suggested Remedy 
Among the many criticisms of Rawls’ account of global justice, little 
consideration is given to the pivotal point that the model is unstable due to its potential 
for becoming a modus vivendi. 1 A modus vivendi is an arrangement of coordinated self-
restraint of competitive behavior between two or more states in the hopes of self-interest 
maximization and a peaceful coexistence.  I argue here that Rawls’ The Law of Peoples is 
vulnerable to this critique for two reasons: the oversight of what I call the aggressive 
state, and the restricted operation of public reason in the Society of Peoples. I ultimately 
suggest that adopting a model of public reason widened to permit participation of 
qualified individuals external to the Society of Peoples, in conjunction with revisions to 
the grounds for just intervention in the Law of Peoples, alleviates both of these issues. 
In Section I, I explain Rawls’ conception of global justice and public reason as 
seen in The Law of Peoples. In Section II, I elaborate my critique of instability, 
illustrating why Rawls’ model has the potential for becoming a modus vivendi. In Section 
III, I explain how The Law of Peoples permits aggressive states. In Section IV, I spell out 
my two-part remedy for the instability exemplified by the aggressive state: one, 
extending the permissible grounds for intervention from just human rights violations also 
to include the defense against unjust inequalities being imposed upon one state or peoples 
by another, as well as two, a more inclusive conception of public reason that permits all 
reasonable citizens – not merely representatives of liberal and decent peoples – to 
participate. While doing this, I consider and refute objections to each of these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Most criticisms are primarily concerned with his characterization of human rights. For a sampling of 
literature treating this issue see Allen Buchanan’s Taking the Human out of Human Rights, David Reidy’s 
Political Authority and Human Rights, or Wilfred Hinsch and Markus Stepanians’ Human Rights as Moral 
Claim Rights 
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components. In refuting these objections I confirm that my two suggested modifications 
to the Law of Peoples should be adopted so that the threat of instability can be 
definitively eliminated. 
 
I. Rawls’ The Law of Peoples  
To determine the nature of global justice, Rawls implements a second original 
position.2 This differs from the first original position, a key component of his account of 
justice on the domestic scale presented in A Theory of Justice, in a few ways. First, in the 
second original position, peoples have representatives and these representatives are taken 
to be rational. Second, unlike individuals in the first original position, these peoples, 
taken as a single body, do not have comprehensive doctrines of the good. The absence of 
such doctrines is because a liberal society does not have a conception of the good, only 
the individuals within the society do. So representatives of the peoples do not operate 
behind the veil with a particular comprehensive doctrine of the good in mind because 
there is no comprehensive doctrine that can be ascribed to the peoples as a whole. Third, 
a peoples’ fundamental interests are specified by their political conception of justice, not 
by the principles they agree to within the Law of Peoples. This situation is unlike the first 
original position because individuals’ fundamental interests are specified by their 
conception of the good. Fourth, peoples select principles of justice from varying 
interpretations of the pre-set list of eight principles of the Law of Peoples. This limitation 
is placed on peoples so that their rights and duties are derived, “…from the Law of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For Rawls’ treatment of the second original position and the principles of the Law of Peoples, see The 
Law of Peoples, 32-40.	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Peoples itself, to which they would agree along with other peoples in suitable 
circumstances.”3 
These eight principles are:  
1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and 
independence are to be respected by other peoples.  
2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings.  
3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind 
them. 
4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention. 
5. Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate 
war for reasons other than self-defense. 
6. Peoples are to honor human rights. 
7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the 
conduct of war. 
8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under 
unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or 
decent political or social regime.4 
 
Like in the first original position, representatives operate behind a veil of ignorance that 
prevents them from knowing such things as level of economic development, resources, 
features of the population they are representing, or the size of the territory the population 
occupies.5 They do know, however, that there are reasonable and favorable conditions 
being fulfilled that make a constitutional democracy plausible. Representatives negotiate 
to determine the terms of cooperation that are fair, just as in the first original position, but 
this negotiation is done only in terms of the eight principles. Negotiating over just these 
principles helps ensure that “…inequalities are designed to serve the many ends that 
peoples share” while the representatives of peoples try to maintain the equality and 
independence of their own society.6 It is mandatory that the eight principles satisfy the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 ibid., 28, 40. 
4 The Law of Peoples, 37. Rawls acknowledges that this list may be incomplete, or have superfluous 
principles. 
5 ibid., 32-33. 
6 ibid., 41.	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criterion of reciprocity, because Rawls holds this criterion as characteristic of liberalism. 
The criterion of reciprocity requires that “…when terms are proposed as the most 
reasonable terms of fair cooperation, those proposing them must think it at least 
reasonable for others to accept them, as free and equal citizens, and not as dominated or 
manipulated or under pressure caused by an inferior political or social position.”7 This 
criterion aids in ensuring that global disparities in power or wealth are acceptable to those 
affected. Reasonable pluralism, like the criterion of reciprocity, is crucial for a global 
structure to attain liberalism. Rawls claims that public reason can serve as the basis from 
which a diverse8 array of peoples can develop the Law of Peoples within a liberal 
conception. Public reason is discussed in more detail below.  
The Society of Peoples is composed of only peoples that subscribe to the ideals 
and principles of the Law of Peoples, which are determined by implementing the second 
original position. Two types of peoples are members of the Society of Peoples: liberal 
peoples and decent peoples. Liberal peoples have three features: (i) they have, “…a 
reasonably just democratic government that serves their fundamental interests…” (ii) the 
citizens are united by common sympathies, which is essentially synonymous with a 
feeling of nationalism, and (iii) a moral nature.9 By virtue of (i), liberal peoples respect 
human rights. It is easiest to understand the status of decent peoples (as well as those not 
included in the Society of Peoples) if one first examines the role of human rights in The 
Law of Peoples.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 ibid., 14. 
8 By diverse peoples Rawls means peoples with “…distinctive institutions and languages, religions and 
cultures, as well as their different histories, variously situated as they are in different regions and territories 
of the world and experiencing different events” (55). 
9 ibid., 23. 
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According to Rawls, human rights are a special class of urgent rights that include 
“…the right to life; to liberty (… a sufficient measure of liberty of conscience to ensure 
freedom of religion and thought); to property…; and to formal equality… (that is, that 
similar cases be treated similarly).”10 Human rights set a necessary – though not sufficient 
– standard for the decency of an institution, and they are intrinsic to the Law of Peoples.11 
Human rights have three features: (i) fulfillment is a necessary condition for a society’s 
institutions and legal order to be considered decent, (ii) fulfillment is sufficient to exclude 
“justified and forceful intervention by other peoples”, and (iii) they set a limit to 
reasonable pluralism.12 Reasonable pluralism is the idea that free institutions tend to have 
and foster a diversity of comprehensive doctrines among their (the institution’s) 
members.13 I take this to mean that when human rights set a limit to reasonable pluralism, 
they deem unreasonable those comprehensive doctrines that fail to respect human rights. 
Essentially, if the standards set by human rights are not met, the Society of Peoples has 
prima facie justification for intervention of various kinds. 
 Decent peoples, like liberal peoples, respect human rights.14 This prohibits liberal 
peoples from intervening upon them. Decent peoples also respect their members’ rights 
to be consulted in political decisions and to voice dissent, despite members not having 
democratic rights. Dissenters must be heard fairly, and not dismissed as incompetent 
solely in virtue of being a dissenter. Perhaps most importantly, decent peoples lack 
aggressive aims and must seek legitimate ends through peaceful channels (such as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 ibid., 65. 
11 For Rawls’ discussion of human rights, see The Law of Peoples, 78-85. 
12 ibid., 81. 
13 Political Liberalism, 36. 
14 For Rawls’ explanation of decent peoples, see The Law of Peoples, 60-65.	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diplomacy and trade). It is thought that these features of decent peoples afford them the 
opportunity to transform into fully liberal peoples eventually. 
Outlaw states, however, refuse to abide by a reasonable Law of Peoples.15 
Because of this refusal, they cannot participate in the Society of Peoples. Rawls 
characterizes outlaw states as regimes that justify engaging in war to potentially advance 
their rational (yet unreasonable) interests. Rawls also mentions an alternative form of 
outlaw state in a passing footnote. This outlaw state violates human rights, but is not 
well-ordered16 and is not aggressive. The violation of human rights means not only that 
they violate rights recognized by the Society of Peoples as reasonably just, but also that 
peoples may permissibly intervene upon them. 
 There are two other categories of societies that cannot partake in the Society of 
Peoples. The first is the burdened society: a society that is greatly disadvantaged in the 
pursuit of becoming either a decent or liberal peoples due to external historical, social, 
and economic circumstances. The second is the benevolent absolutist state: a society that 
is non-aggressive and respects human rights, but fails to be well-ordered because it does 
not give its members a role in political decisions. 
 In order to have a full understanding of The Law of Peoples, one must understand 
the notion of public reason and its important role in global justice. On Rawls’ model, free 
and equal peoples participate in the public reason of the Society of Peoples, hashing out 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 For Rawls’ treatment of non-liberal and non-decent societies, see The Law of Peoples, 90-92. 
16 For a society to be well-ordered it has three features: (i) everyone accepts and has knowledge that 
everyone else accepts the same principles of justice, (ii) its basic structure satisfies the accepted principles 
of justice and this is known, and (iii) its citizens have a sense of justice that guide them to generally comply 
with the basic institutions that are regarded as just. For a more thorough explanation, see Rawls’ Political 
Liberalism, 35-40.	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what their mutual relations, as peoples, should look like.17 His reasoning for claiming that 
only members of the Society of Peoples can engage in public reason follows from his 
stipulation that only they have the capacity for a moral nature, making them capable of 
carrying out the moral duty of public reason. States lack this moral nature, being moved 
purely by their rational interests. This moral deficiency makes states unsuitable 
candidates to reasonably consider how to advance the project of liberalism in the forum 
of public reason. The content of public reason consists of the criteria, ideas, political 
concepts, and principles of the Law of Peoples. It is important to note that “…public 
reason is invoked by members of the Society of Peoples, and its principles are addressed 
to peoples as peoples. They are not expressed in terms of comprehensive doctrines of 
truth or of right… but in terms that can be shared by different peoples.”18 Discussing 
principles in shared terms ensures that public reason can properly serve as the basis for a 
broad spectrum of peoples to develop and refine the Law of Peoples.  
The ideal of public reason is realized when government officials – acting as 
representatives – follow and act on the Law of Peoples. These representatives explain to 
other peoples their reasons for enforcing or “…revising a people’s foreign policy and 
affairs of state that involve other societies.”19 Private citizens can achieve the ideal of 
public reason by imagining themselves as government officials and considering what 
foreign policy they would think it reasonable to advance. It should be noted, though, that 
while private citizens can achieve the ideal of public reason, the conclusions they reach 
carry no weight in the global discussion and their achieving the ideal does not amount to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 For Rawls’ discussion of public reason in the Society of Peoples, see The Law of Peoples, 54-58. 
18 ibid., 55.  
19 ibid., 56. 
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it being realized. Rather, private citizens’ capacity for achieving the ideal ensures that 
they (the citizens) will hold their representatives (government officials) to the appropriate 
standard for participation in public reason.  Rawls holds that public reason “…is part of 
the political and social basis of peace and understanding among peoples” when this 
disposition among citizens is “firm and widespread”.20 When public reason is widespread 
in this way peoples are properly suited to discuss in shared terms – and eventually 
determine – how to address critical issues. 	  
 
II. The Instability of The Law of Peoples  
  Rawls’ model for global justice, as it stands, is vulnerable to the critique that it is 
inherently unstable due to the likelihood of devolving into a modus vivendi.21 As 
previously mentioned, I take a modus vivendi to be the coordinated self-restraint of 
competitive behavior between two or more parties in the hopes of self-interest 
maximization and a peaceful coexistence.  The parties involved care little for the interests 
of each other, and since self-interests are the primary concern of parties, the modus 
vivendi will not be based upon shared values between parties; it is not a value-based 
world order. Once self-restraint is established between the parties, the modus vivendi 
perpetuates itself by “…ensuring that each party has sufficient incentives to participate so 
long as most others are participating as well.”22 This arrangement ensures continued 
participation by making it the case that a party is damaged if it ceases participating. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 ibid., 57. 
21 One might claim that Thomas Pogge raises a similar criticism in his work Realizing Rawls concerning 
Rawls’ brief explanation of global justice presented in A Theory of Justice. I maintain, however, that there 
are substantial differences in our reasoning that brings us to the same conclusion. I do, however, utilize 
Pogge’s description of what a modus vivendi is and its implied dangers.	  
22 Realizing Rawls, 219. 
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Rawls’ model leaves open the possibility of an extremely unbalanced distribution of 
power by giving little consideration to socioeconomic inequality, and this unbalanced 
power or lack of consideration for inequality, in turn, allows unjust inequalities to arise. 
Consider the following case: a party, Haplessburg, enters the modus vivendi at a 
disadvantage compared to most parties participating, due to a lack of natural resources. 
Haplessburg enters the modus vivendi to trade for needed natural resources. Even if 
Haplessburg might instead continue in isolation (to their detriment), it seems additionally 
preferable to participate in the modus vivendi because Haplessburg will obtain protection 
from being attacked or enslaved by the other participants in virtue of a modus vivendi 
being an arrangement of coordinated self-restraint. As Haplessburg continues to 
participate in the modus vivendi, it turns out that they continually lose power23 to the 
point where they wholly depend upon maintaining membership in the modus vivendi, 
even if it is no longer self-interest maximizing. The room left for unchecked inequality 
means that Haplessburg can no longer consider leaving the modus vivendi in favor of 
isolation.  As the modus vivendi moves forward, Haplessburg remains weak because they 
have no option but to comply. 
From this example, it is easy to see that parties cannot prevent bad outcomes. 
Since the modus vivendi is unstable, participants, like Haplessburg, may fear falling into 
the vicious cycle described above and decide to enter war in hopes of establishing 
protection and power. An alternative to this is that the parties involved with greater 
power may preempt the weaker party’s attack. Either way, these measures intended to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 The continual loss of power occurs despite the arrangement satisfying Haplessburg’s minimal declared 
interests. 
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protect “…can lead to a partial or complete breakdown of ordered relations.”24 Even if the 
arrangements of the modus vivendi happen to withstand these attacks, it may be at the 
cost25 of the existence of some of the modus vivendi’s participants.  
 Finally, it is not difficult to imagine how a party may be pragmatically incapable 
of giving precedence to its own values, when they run the risk of not even surviving 
participation in the modus vivendi. If parties fear one another, they will focus upon 
survival and long-term security of their values, rather than short-term actualization of 
said values. It is unlikely that a party would exercise restraint, despite ethical qualms, 
when their existence hangs in the balance, especially when success in prevailing 
seemingly ensures that their values will win out in the end.  
 For these reasons, it is evident that for a modus vivendi to materialize is 
undesirable. Instability from an extremely unbalanced distribution of power, lack of 
protection for parties against horrible outcomes (including being dissolved), and an 
inability to give precedence to one’s values all contribute to the conclusion that a modus 
vivendi will be neither peaceful nor just.  
None of the eight principles address these issues. One may argue that (8) – 
peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that 
prevent their having a just or decent political or social regime – does address this issue by 
requiring liberal and decent peoples to help burdened societies that are prevented from 
establishing just or decent institutions by “unfavorable conditions”. But Rawls does not 
clearly stipulate what precisely amounts to “unfavorable conditions”, making abiding by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Realizing Rawls, 221. 
25 The cost is that participants will likely be demolished or taken over by whichever party exercised the 
greatest power.	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this principle difficult, at best. Additionally, (8) says nothing about preventing severe 
socioeconomic disparity between liberal and decent peoples that have achieved just and 
decent institutions respectively. It is not difficult to imagine a society that is 
socioeconomically disadvantaged, but meets the minimum standards for a decent society, 
preventing it from being classified as a burdened society. There is nothing in Rawls’ 
model to aid these peoples. This situation is problematic because Rawls states that the 
Law of Peoples “…holds that inequalities are not always unjust, and that when they are it 
is because of their unjust effects on the basic structure of the Society of Peoples, and on 
relations among peoples and among their members.”26 Yet it is precisely the latter case 
that I am concerned with.  
It might further be claimed that discussing this principle in the forum of public 
reason could give rise to revisions that would address this issue. There is no guarantee, 
however, that liberal and decent peoples would see to it that extreme socioeconomic 
disparities be protected against because such extremes are not a primary concern of 
Rawls’ liberalism. Rather, the Law of Peoples is concerned with the wellbeing of 
individuals, as well as justice and stability for the right reasons; not distributional 
inequalities.27 
Furthermore, Rawls’ model fails to adequately address what Thomas Pogge refers 
to as the situated assurance problem. The situated assurance problem arises when a 
party’s reasons for accepting the burdens associated with social cooperation are 
undermined due to a lack of assurance that other parties will adhere to the same standards 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26The Law of Peoples, 113. 
27 ibid., 120. 
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of social cooperation.28 As a result, the situated assurance problem “…threatens pervasive 
noncompliance with existing ground rules.”29 One might suggest that principle (2) does 
sufficiently address this issue. (2) States that, “…peoples are to observe treaties and 
undertakings.”30 This, however, is merely a superficial demand. There is no hint at the 
repercussions for failing to observe treaties, and other components of Rawls’ model 
preclude sanctions unless a human rights violation is involved. Additionally, public 
reason is limited only to discussion of the Law of Peoples, not to mechanisms external to 
the Law of Peoples that would ensure enforcement.  
Even if enforcement mechanisms are developed, backing (2) more substantially 
contradicts the sufficient condition of merely satisfying human rights – which liberal and 
decent peoples do by definition – to escape intervention with sanctions. Setting 
consideration of these potential mechanisms aside, the Society of Peoples is left with no 
substantial method for considering enforcing that peoples reasonably observe treaties. 
The same problem arises if one were to cite Rawls’ claim that peoples must be respectful 
of each other and, because of this, treat each other as equals and observe treaties. Once 
again, there is no method in place to ensure that respect is maintained. Rawls’ failure to 
address the situated assurance problem leaves open the possibility that peoples that play 
by the rules will suffer while other peoples ignore them with no repercussions.  
Finally, Rawls’ focus on shared fundamental values accompanied by the concern 
of peoples about complications arising from the situated assurance problem plausibly 
leaves peoples pragmatically incapable of giving precedence to the shared values of their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Realizing Rawls, 100. 
29 ibid., 101. 
30 The Law of Peoples, 37. 
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citizens. Peoples will understandably be more urgently concerned with simply protecting 
themselves and ensuring survival within the global structure. Only once a peoples has 
secured its survival can it concern itself with promoting the values of its own citizens. 
One might respond as above, claiming that (2) resolves the situated assurance problem 
and relieves this concern of peoples. Just as before, this is merely a superficial demand 
until it is backed with legitimate clout. It should again be noted that backing (2) more 
substantially contradicts the sufficient condition of merely satisfying human rights to 
escape intervention with sanctions. Until this problem is solved, the peoples’ fear 
stemming from the situated assurance problem is warranted. 
These three deficiencies in Rawls’ account suggest that his value-based world is 
inherently unstable since it is capable of devolving into a modus vivendi. This possible 
devolvement means that Rawls’ account may not be peaceful or just, which is a problem 
Rawlsian scholars ought to take seriously, given how Rawls considers stability a 
necessary component of any theory of justice. He takes stability to be an institution’s 
ability to remain just when changes are made to accommodate new social circumstances. 
If there is a deviation from justice, the institution will still be considered stable if said 
deviations are “…effectively corrected or held within tolerable bounds by forces within 
the system.”31 Additionally, Rawls values stability for the right reason – a reasonable 
interest “…guided by and congruent with a fair equality and a due respect for all peoples” 
– over stability as a balance of forces.32 He is concerned that peace between states gained 
when stability is of the latter form will “…be at best a modus vivendi, a stable balance of 
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forces only for the time being.”33 As established above, a modus vivendi is evidently 
unstable. If a model of global justice is capable of devolving into a modus vivendi, it too 
is inherently unstable.  It follows from this that Rawls’ global order is neither peaceful 
nor just.  
III. The Aggressive State  
To strengthen my criticism of instability, I present the aggressive state. Rawls 
does not consider the possibility of the aggressive state, and as a result overlooks a 
powerful objection to his view that there is a clear-cut case exemplifying his weakness.34 
Aggressive states lead to further unsatisfactory conclusions for his account, typifying his 
inability to handle a type of institution capable of destabilizing his global order.  
The aggressive state recognizes human rights of its own citizens and citizens of 
other states and peoples, thus meeting some of the necessary (though none of the 
sufficient) conditions for having its institutions and legal order considered decent. This 
state’s recognition of human rights does, however, meet the sufficient condition to be 
protected from intervention, either by sanction or military involvement. Unlike decent 
peoples, this state does not consult members on political decisions, nor does it fairly 
listen to dissenters. In addition, this state seeks its ends aggressively rather than 
peacefully. Thus the aggressive state does not abide by seven of the eight principles that 
constitute the Law of Peoples.  
Consider the following example, intended to illustrate the nature of the 
quintessential aggressive state: imagine two states that rely upon each other for limited 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 ibid.45. Italicizes author’s.  
34 In their work Are Liberal Peoples Peaceful? Leif Wenar and Branko Milanovic claim that a state with the 
same features as the aggressive state is a type of outlaw state considered by Rawls. In support of this claim 
they cite The Law of Peoples, 64. It is not apparent from the text, however, that Rawls explicitly or 
implicitly considers this type of state, or would consider it an outlaw state. 
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natural resources: K and A. K keeps to itself while A is aggressive. Now imagine that A 
threatens to invade K, unless K exports its natural resources to A for no compensation. 
Here A has aggressively imposed a demand on K that K can do little about without losing 
the much needed natural resource it receives from A.  K is prohibited from intervening 
upon A on Rawls’ model unless (i) A violates human rights in some manner, or (ii) A 
actually attacks K. That is, pre-emptive self-defense in the face of a threat is 
impermissible according to Rawls.35 Rawls’ model consequently allows A to extort K 
while facing no repercussions for reprehensible behavior until their (A’s) actions have 
escalated to the point of attack. 
As mentioned above, Rawls definitively states, “[human rights] fulfillment is 
sufficient to exclude justified and forceful intervention by other peoples, for example by 
diplomatic and economic sanctions, or in grave cases by military force.”36 If we are to 
take Rawls’ model seriously, the aggressive state is protected from intervention due to its 
satisfaction of human rights. It is a mistake to say, however, that the aggressive state must 
be fully immune to intervention initiated by the Society of Peoples despite its aggressive 
aims, failure to have a consultation hierarchy, and failure to fairly listen to dissenters. 
This is because of the threat the aggressive state poses to not only the rational self-
interests of other states and peoples, but also the shared values of the Society of Peoples, 
and as a result, the stability of the global order.  Determining appropriate standards for 
handling this society seems possible, but at a cost.37  
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36 ibid, 80. 
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what he refers to as a delinquent state. Taken alone this seems like a suitable solution, but it is unlikely that 
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To maintain Rawls’ framework one may either bite the bullet and grant full 
immunity to aggressive societies or, alternatively, reconsider basing his framework for 
intervention solely upon human rights. Granting full immunity is simply not an 
acceptable option for reasons discussed below. In considering basing the framework for 
intervention, one logically has three routes to choose from: (i) maintaining that human 
rights violations are the only justification for intervention, (ii) completely disposing of 
human rights violations as the only justification for intervention, or (iii) claiming that 
human rights violations and something more (taken together or separately) are the only 
justifications for intervention. If one takes the first route and insists that human rights are 
the unique basis for intervention, one must at least conduct a substantive overhaul of the 
necessary and sufficient conditions pertaining to them. I set this option aside in favor of 
the third course. Taking the second course seems wholly unreasonable, namely because it 
is an obsoletely held position that institutions should sit idly by while human rights 
violations are occurring. If one takes the third course and adds unjustly imposed 
inequality upon one state or peoples by another as a basis for intervention, in conjunction 
with a more inclusive account of public reason, then the threat of instability presently 
faced by Rawls’ model is resolved. I discuss these modifications at length below.  
 As it is currently formulated, Rawls’ position lacks the tools to deal with the 
aggressive state that exemplifies the inherent instability of his model. The dangers that 
the aggressive state pose to other peoples and states while going unchecked account for 
Rawls’ deficiency. If the aggressive state is permitted to carry on because it is free from 
intervention and sanctions, the peoples that were not concerned about the situated 
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assurance problem prior to its recognition should certainly be concerned afterwards. 
Moreover, the fundamental assurance problem is more likely to be instantiated.  
Those threatened by the aggressive state risk being attacked or thoroughly 
disbanded. Prior to attack, the threatened cannot place sanctions on the aggressive state 
precisely because it (the aggressive state) is respecting human rights. The threatened also 
may not preemptively attack the aggressive state, because Rawls would consider such an 
attack to be a violation of just war doctrine.38 Once attacked, liberal and decent peoples 
may go to war to defend themselves, but there is no guarantee that they will prevail. If the 
aggressive state prevails, the overpowered peoples will likely lose all of their control.  
One may respond by citing the Law of Peoples as providing protection for those peoples 
overpowered by the aggressive state. But as it stands, it is not clear to what extent liberal 
or decent peoples can permissibly aid those peoples in unfavorable conditions arising 
from being overpowered. Depending upon what formally amounts to intervention, liberal 
or decent peoples may not be able to provide aid to the overpowered peoples without 
intervening against the aggressive state. Note that intervention may merely be strong-
arming or a trade sanction intended to weaken the aggressive state and aid the 
overpowered. But, once again, these measures of intervention are prohibited under 
Rawls’ model, since the aggressive state respects the limited account of human rights up 
until they become militarily aggressive.  
The presence of the aggressive state within Rawls’ model makes devolving into a 
modus vivendi even more plausible than I previously suggested. The plausibility of this 
occurrence, in turn, illustrates the inherent instability of his model. Given Rawls’ explicit 	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acknowledgement of the importance of stability for any theory of justice, his failure to 
consider the aggressive state is a serious oversight. This instability can be remedied, 
though, by a substantial revision of public reason and an amendment to when intervention 
is permissible.  
 
 
IV. A Suggested Remedy  
I suggest revising Rawls’ account of public reason to include reasonable citizens 
of all states, rather than only the representatives of peoples that comprise the Society of 
Peoples. When paired with the amendment that a state or peoples having unjust 
inequalities imposed upon it by another state or peoples can permissibly intervene against 
its oppressor, these revisions successfully handle all three issues that contribute to my 
criticism that Rawls’ model is unstable. Additionally, this remedy ensures stability and its 
maintenance through advancing the project of liberalism, in keeping with the spirit of 
Rawls’ project. To recall, these three issues are the sparse consideration of 
socioeconomic inequality that gives rise to an extremely unbalanced distribution of 
power, failure to address the situated assurance problem, and peoples being pragmatically 
incapable of giving precedence to the shared values of their citizens.  
To handle those states and peoples that suggest and forcefully implement unjust 
inequalities upon other states or peoples, I argue it is permissible for the affected state or 
peoples and third-party defenders to intervene upon the oppressor by sanction, or in grave 
cases, by military force. Recall that inequalities are unjust when they have unjust effects 
on the basic structure of the Society of Peoples, and the relations between peoples and 
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between their members. This amendment to what warrants intervention alleviates not 
only the threat posed by the aggressive state, but also the threats posed by all other states 
and peoples that refuse to play by the rules at any given time.  As a result, instability due 
to devolving into a modus vivendi is no longer a danger for Rawls’ model, despite the 
plausibility of the aggressive state. By revising the grounds for intervention, the Law of 
Peoples is backed with the necessary legitimate clout that addresses the three issues 
Rawls’ model was previously incapable of handling. The potential for a dangerously, and 
unjustly, unbalanced distribution of power is no longer likely due to peoples and states 
having an enforcement mechanism available to protect against unjust impositions. This 
protection ensures that peoples and states reasons for accepting the burdens associated 
with social cooperation will not be undermined due to a lack of assurance that other 
parties will adhere to the same standards of social cooperation. And when peoples are no 
longer concerned with the situated assurance problem, the inability of peoples to give 
precedence to the shared values of their citizens is no longer an issue.  
One might object to this amendment to the Law of Peoples, claiming it is ad hoc, 
added merely to address the issue of those imposing unjust arrangements and is not 
cohesive with Rawls’ overall project. I maintain, however, that this amendment to the 
grounds for intervention simply follows from the other eight principles of the Law of 
Peoples. Rawls himself acknowledges that this “…statement of principles is, admittedly, 
incomplete” and “other principles need to be added”.39 The amendment to intervention 
that I propose adding aids in ensuring that the first three principles regarding freedom and 
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independence, observance of treaties, and respecting equality are upheld. Furthermore, it 
does not go against any of the pre-existing eight principles.  
One might claim that I problematically uphold that states may also protect 
themselves against unjustly imposed inequalities, despite their not being liberal or just. It 
is questionable at best, though, that states must be subject to unjust inequalities in light of 
their not being wholly just themselves. This amendment to permissible grounds for 
intervention – taken with an altered account of public reason – not only resolves the 
aforementioned issues that lead to instability, it is also cohesive with other aspects of 
Rawls’ project.   
By making public reason more inclusive, alterations to the Law of Peoples are not 
made by only the peoples enforcing the eight principles – the Society of Peoples. Instead, 
all citizens that are inherently affected by decisions pertaining to the global institution 
(the Society of Peoples) will have the opportunity to engage in public reason, provided 
they are reasonable. I adopt Rawls’ tenants of reasonableness, which he presents in 
Political Liberalism.40 A reasonable individual both willingly proposes and abides by fair 
principles of cooperation among equals, and readily accepts the burdens of judgment 
when engaging in public reason. While this definition of reasonable is not made explicit 
in the account of public reason given in The Law of Peoples, it is implicit by way of the 
principle of reciprocity and the fact that representatives of peoples are negotiating terms 
that they know their peoples will be subject to if they wish to maintain membership in the 
Society of Peoples. 
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Rawls holds that participating in public reason is an intrinsically moral duty, like 
other political rights and duties.41 Recall that his reasoning for claiming that only 
members of the Society of Peoples can engage in public reason follows from his 
stipulation that only they have the capacity for a moral nature, allowing them to realize 
the moral duty of public reason. In contrast, states lack this moral nature, making them 
unsuitable candidates for participation in public reason. But it does not clearly follow 
from the nature of states that the state’s citizens, when taken independently, are also 
incapable of advancing liberalism. One can easily imagine a citizen of a state that has a 
moral nature and satisfies reasonableness. The moral nature and reasonableness of said 
citizen allows the citizen to imagine herself as a government official and consider what 
foreign policy she would think it reasonable to advance, enabling her to achieve the ideal 
of public reason. When citizens from around the globe that share these qualities engage in 
public reason together, they will be able to realize the ideal analogously to how 
representatives realize the ideal, according to Rawls.  
I uphold, like Rawls, that contributing to the dialogue of public reason is a moral 
duty. This means that on my model reasonable citizens with a moral nature have a moral 
duty to contribute to the dialogue of public reason, and the Society of Peoples should 
recognize this moral duty, seeing as its fulfillment is crucial to furthering the project of 
liberalism. This is primarily because Rawls intends for the global institution to uphold the 
tenants of liberalism. Thus the global institution must recognize the moral duty of 
reasonable citizens to participate in the public reason that shapes said institution, seeing 
as it is the global institution’s aim to be a liberal democracy that would grant citizens 
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democratic rights. Additionally, it seems inappropriate for the Society of Peoples to 
determine independently what amounts to and triggers aid given to other institutions 
(peoples or states). Those reasonable citizens with membership in states or peoples 
subject to inequalities imposed by other states or peoples should be able to aid in the 
revision of those conditions that impact the institutions they live within, both globally and 
domestically. The global institution lived within is the Society of Peoples, while the 
domestic institution is the citizen’s state or peoples. This idea appeals to the principle of 
affected interests, which states individuals should be able to influence decisions that 
affect them.42 Decisions that are not influenced by those affected may not appropriately 
consider their interests. In order to maintain the fairness that Rawls deems crucial to the 
political processes of the Society of Peoples’ basic structure, it seems appropriate that all 
reasonable citizens – not merely representatives of peoples – have the opportunity to 
determine what size contributions are acceptable for a given predicted return and what 
inequalities are just. 43 Furthermore, to arbitrarily exclude the perspectives of some 
individuals affected by distributional concerns merely by their state membership 
contradicts the call for reasonable pluralism that Rawls values so highly.  
While it cannot be decisively determined what conclusions those participating in 
this comprehensive public reason will come to – as this is an empirical question – there is 
reason to be optimistic. As more participants are welcomed – due to their moral 
obligation rooted in their being reasonable moral citizens – to engage in public reason it 
is likely that the ideal of public reason will be achieved. As citizens move towards the 
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disposition to “…repudiate government officials and candidates for public office who 
violate the public reason…” of free and equal citizens, the political and social basis of 
peace and understanding will be strengthened, just as Rawls had hoped. 44  The 
achievement of the ideal of public reason will feasibly ensure that inequalities that do 
arise are just in nature because there has been true fairness in participation and consent. If 
it is the case that there has been true fairness in participation and consent, inequalities 
will not contribute to the situated assurance problem or the inability of peoples to given 
precedence to the shared values of their citizens, unlike in Rawls’ original model. It is in 
this way that revising public reason not only aids in ensuring stability, but also advances 
the project of liberalism as explained by Rawls.    
 One might wonder why I have decided to argue for all reasonable citizens to 
participate in public reason, rather than just representatives of citizens. I do so for two 
reasons. The lack of inclusivity in Rawls’ public reason arises from only reasonable 
representatives – government officials of the members of the Society of Peoples – being 
permitted to participate. In order to recognize the sentiments of those individuals affected 
by global policies, more than just reasonable representatives need to be included. The 
need for consideration of reasonable individuals arises out of the government officials of 
states being, by nature, unreasonable due to their abstaining from becoming liberal or 
decent. Additionally, the government officials of states may not serve as representatives 
of their state’s members, depending upon what type of government the state has. Some 
examples include a patriarchy without elected representatives, or a state where elections 
are notoriously fraudulent. When dealing with outlaw states, according to Rawls, the 
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leaders and officials of said state should be distinguished from civilian members because 
“[the leaders and officials] are responsible… the civilian population, often kept in 
ignorance and swayed by state propaganda, is not responsible.”45 If government officials 
are the only people that are permitted to participate in public reason, then there is the 
potential for all voices of a given state’s citizens to go unheard. But the voices of those 
affected being unacknowledged goes against the principle of affected interests. By 
obligating all reasonable citizens of all states and peoples to participate in public reason, 
there is no longer a concern of lack of representation in the dialogue.  
 One might suggest that rather than obligating all reasonable citizens to participate, 
there should be a shift in what it means to be a representative. However, including all 
reasonable citizens is preferable to this move because altering the definition of 
representative presents a host of issues and is ultimately inconsistent with Rawls’ project, 
which I aim to leave intact. If one changes what it means to be a representative from 
being the sole representative of a state or peoples to being the representative of a 
collection of individuals based on some shared interest, then the formal equality that 
Rawls values so highly is abandoned. I am taking shared interest to be something like 
feminist values, subscription to a religion, persons with disabilities activism, or an 
interest in racial equality. The problem with this type of representation is that an 
individual might – and likely does – have multiple interests, and so they will either be 
forced to choose a primary interest by which they will be represented, or be represented 
by a multitude of interests. For individuals to be forced to choose a primary interest may 
deny other components of their identity, which is a violation of the human right to liberty 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 ibid., 95. 
     McKittrick-Sweitzer, Lavender, 2015, UMSL, p.     	  
	  
27 
of consciousness. For individuals to have varying numbers of representatives respective 
to their interests does not amount to formal equality, and thus violates the human right to 
formal equality. If individuals act as their own representatives, as I suggest, then liberty 
of consciousness and formal equality is maintained because each reasonable individual 
eligible to participate in public reason is granted the same weight. It is for these reasons 
that I offer the solution of participation of all reasonable individuals, rather than merely 
representatives of one form or another.  
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 In short, I have illustrated how The Law of Peoples is vulnerable to the criticism 
of instability, which is exemplified by Rawls’ oversight of the aggressive state. In order 
to address this criticism in keeping with Rawls’ overall project, I have argued that the 
grounds for intervention be amended so that it is also just for a state or peoples to 
intervene upon another state or peoples when unjust inequalities are being imposed. I 
have also argued that Rawls’ conception of public reason is too narrow, and must be 
expanded to include participation of all reasonable citizens, not merely representatives of 
the peoples with membership in the Society of Peoples. In refuting objections to each of 
these alterations, I have established that this two-part revision is the most favorable route 
to be taken in addressing the concern of instability while remaining in keeping with 
Rawls’ overall project.  
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